The cycle of the Common Agricultural Policy reforms begun in 1992 and that finished, for the time being, in 2013, profoundly transformed the agricultural framework of the EU. Taken as a whole, the process consisted of the progressive, partial and asymmetric liberalization of European agriculture, since much more emphasis was placed on dismantling intervention mechanisms than on aiding the restructuring, modernization and adaptation to a more competitive environment. In this context, and with an increasingly more open commercial policy, the States and the regions are obliged to design strategies to increase their competitiveness and innovation within the framework of the current Common Agricultural Policy (2014)(2015)(2016)(2017)(2018)(2019)(2020). This is even more important for the regions most affected by the reforms. Under this argument, this paper reveals the principal qualitative and quantitative unknowns of the regional agricultural policy in Spain after the application of the Health Check in 2008, with special emphasis on the evolution of the Axis 1 of Rural Development.
Introduction
The EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was reformed in 2013. Although this reform was not very profound it opened up a new stage in the history of the CAP, since it broke definitively with the historical production and the instruments that incentivized production and distorted the markets. This transformation generated risks and opportunities (Compés & García, 2013) , as well as a certain change in the mentality of the Member States (Atance, 2007) . These risks are related to the traumatic changes in the sector that cause reduced activity and populations in certain regions (Compés & García, 2009) . The opportunities include the challenges of sustainability, growth and competitiveness (Massot, 2013) , since the reform has put more emphasis on deregulating the markets than on restructuring, modernizing and adapting to a more competitive environment, making manifest the structural weakness of the primary sector and the increasingly precarious situation of the smallest producers, with an impact in Spain that will be influenced by the wide differences among its regions.
from those who request them, since the public contribution can reach as much as 40% of the investment (except for young farmers and residents in disadvantaged areas, who can receive a higher percentage), with the participation of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) of 21%. This element is crucial in considering these aids, which will be restricted by the scarcity of financial resources both in Europe, where demands are being made to reduce the agricultural budget (Massot, 2010) , and even their renationalization (Castillo & Ramos, 2010) , and in Spain, where the economic crisis has imposed severe cuts in public spending that have been applied unequally among the different regions and territories (Regidor & Troitiño, 2008) .
In this context, the questions that can be asked are the following: What is the situation of the different regions of Spanish agriculture in relation to the quantity and nature of public assistance received until 2013? In the ambit of agricultural competitiveness, what strategies have been followed in each of Spain's Autonomous Communities (AC)? What is their economic impact within the framework of public aids and how was this affected by the CAP's reforms? Due to their specialization in different products, the starting position of each AC is different, with appreciable differences in the levels of support provided by the CAP, the objectives and instruments. For example, price and market supports may still be important in AC "A", as compared to the policy of budget transfers for rural development practiced in AC "B", or that of decoupled aids in AC "C". This situation of the decentralized application of agricultural policy is an obstacle to the rational planning of decisions and coordinated public actions if there is no previous mechanism in place of reliable information that allows the effects to be estimated and followed in each AC in order to correctly diagnose the origin of the problems that the public programs aim to solve, there already being in the literature previous cases of agricultural economy (Atance & Gómez-Limón, 2004; Philippidis, 2005) .
In this context, and in line with the recommendations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (the organization that has been most active, together with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in dismantling price support instruments), the objective of the present work is to orient political decision making as to the strategies to be adopted in the different Spanish regional agricultural sectors as regards competitiveness, efficiency and innovation. For this, the initial situation of the individual ACs will be assessed, using the OECD's advances in estimating agricultural support indicators as a methodological base in order to obtain the following specific goals:
(1) To classify and quantify by regions public aid to Spanish agriculture during the period 2002-2012 by adapting the OECD's method of calculating aid indicators.
(2) Analyze the evolution of public aid to the regions into national and regional contributions.
(3) Examine the evolution of Rural Development Axis 1, the measures included by regions and their economic impact.
(4) Evaluate the scope of the policies that affect Spanish agricultural competitiveness.
The first efforts aimed at estimating regional agricultural support were the works undertaken by the European Commission after the reforms of the nineties, with results for 1994 and 1996 (European Commission, 2001 ) and for 1991 and 1995 (Tarditi & Zanias, 2001) . These used the concept of Producer Support Estimate introduced by the OECD (OECD, 2007) , and also in the study by Zanias (2002) on calculating transfers in the MS. The European Spatial Planning Observation Network (2005) project analyzed the territorial impact of the CAP in 1999 with continental products (i.e. non-Mediterranean) only and calculating the transfers of the "first pillar". Other studies have analyzed transfers in countries with a federal administration, such as Switzerland (Walkenhorst, 2003) , Germany (Anders et al., 2004; Hansen, 2005) and the USA (Sumner & Brunke, 2003) . In Spain, the first study on public spending on agriculture in the ACs was by García et al. (1994) . The Libro Blanco de la Agricultura y el Desarrollo Rural (MAPA, 2004 ) was a later work.
The Spanish preoccupation with formulating the follow-up and evaluation of support was responsible for the development of a line of research based on the methodological contribution of the OECD for calculating agricultural support indicators. The most valuable contributions were the discussion of the calculation options of the Market Price Support (MPS) for products not included in the OECD's estimations (Mediterranean products), testing an MSP that measured the percentage differences between domestic and international prices and measuring the customs duty with third countries (García & Andrés, 2007) and a comparison of the CAP transfers with the support for agriculture in other OECD countries (Andrés & García, 2010 ). An application following the WTO methodology can be found in Andrés and García (2016) . In addition to the series on Analysis and Perspective by the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Food and the Environment (MAFE), in the ambit of prospective studies the most important work was carried out by Blanco et al. (2011) , which described potential scenarios of the single payment system and analyzed the redistribution effects of these scenarios by means of the CAPRI partial equilibrium model. Its results suggest that the convergence of direct aids would have a minimal impact at the EU level. However, its effects would be highly significant for certain regions and production systems, as in each MS the regions would benefit that historically have received the lowest average payments per hectare, and between States there would be a transfer of funds from the EU-15 to the EU-12. Other studies on the overall European situation have reached similar conclusions (Velázquez, 2008; Zahrnt, 2009; Erjavec et al., 2011; Gocht et al., 2011) .
The debate on the competitiveness of agriculture and the evaluation of its regional component has recently been revived. Studies have been published on European agriculture (Hermans et al., 2010) , at the national level (Czyzewski & Stepien, 2011; Popov, 2012; Aggelopoulos et al., 2014) , and others on a local level (Fragoso et al., 2011; Cofas & Toma, 2014; Zasada & Piorr, 2015) . In general, this line of research concludes that the CAP's rural development policies to boost competitiveness have important local effects in their application and in the distribution of funds and that it is becoming essential to promote structural strategies to stimulate the economic competitiveness of holdings in order to increase incomes and rural employment and reduce the long-term tendency to disinvestment and to promote new agricultural and non-agricultural activities in the least competitive zones (Note 1). PSE is an indicator adopted by the OECD to measure support to agriculture: the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income. In order to be able to compare support levels in different countries or regions, the PSE is normally expressed as a ratio based on the gross value of the producer's income (%PSE: PSE as a share of gross farm receipts, including support). The PSE is calculated for individual products and can be added for the purposes of obtaining a national or regional PSE. It is important to note that the emphasis of the PSE lies not only in its total amount, but also in its evolution and distribution among the different support instruments, whose degree of market distortion is variable. There are forms of aid that distort international trade more than others (Blandford, 2005) . In general, it tends to accept that transfers through prices imply a greater degree of distortion. The OECD methodology makes it possible to classify support by type, considering on the one hand transfers derived from price interventions and, on the other hand, transfer groups related to disbursements or direct payments to producers. Thus, the PSE includes two types of transfers: a) those that keep domestic prices to the highest (and occasionally lower) producers of the world, forming the component called Market Price Support (MPS); and b) those that provide payments to producers, based on criteria such as the volume produced, the amount of inputs used, the number of animals, the area cultivated or the income received, forming the component called budget transfers.
Materials and Methods

Measures
The OECD also considers the GSSE, the annual monetary value of gross transfers arising from policy measures that create enabling conditions for the primary agricultural sector through development of private or public services, and through institutions and infrastructures regardless of their objectives and impacts on farm production and income, or consumption of farm products. It includes policies where primary agriculture is the main beneficiary, but does not include any payments to individual producers. GSSE transfers do not directly alter producer receipts, costs or consumption expenditures (%GSSE: GSSE as a share of TSE). Based on the above indicators, the OECD obtains the TSE; this is an indicator of the annual monetary value of all gross transfers from taxpayers and consumers arising from policy measures that support agriculture, net of associated budgetary receipts, regardless of their objectives and impacts on farm production and income, or consumption of farm products. The TSE is the sum of transfers or payments to producers (PSE), structural actions (GSSE) and transfers or payments of taxpayers to consumers (direct subsidy to the first consumer). The percentage TSE (%TSE) expresses general support as a percentage of GDP. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the indicators according to the type of aid they contain, including an algebraic detail about their calculation methodology. For more information, readers can consult the PSE Manual (Note 3). 
Results
The Size of Public Support for Spanish Agriculture
The support to Spanish agriculture is mainly concentrated on Andalusia, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla & León, Catalonia and Aragón, regions with large agricultural sectors (as determined by their Productin figures (PRA), Useful Tillage Surface (SAU) and Agricultural Work Units (UTA)). Except for Catalonia, their PRA contributes a large percentage to the regional GDP (Note 9). Their evolution shows a clear tendency towards reduced activities for reasons that will be explained in the subsequent sections of this paper. As can be seen in Table 2 , the total support received by each AC (TOTAL TSE) is the sum of transfers from within Spain (TSE NATIONAL) and the EU (TSE CAP). Source: Compiled by the authors.
Transfers from Spain: Composition and Characteristics
The transfers from inside Spain include the co-financing of rural development measures and transfers from the central government in Madrid and those from the regional governments. These transfers do not include production-based payments (PSE Category A) and most of them are structural measures (GSSE) when compared with the EU transfers (8% of state aids, 34% of co-financed rural development and over 50% of regional aids). These figures reveal the role of state aid as a supplement to the financing of services provided to the agricultural sector in general. As the rural development measures are co-financed, they are mostly given to individual holdings as provided by the CAP, especially in the PSE categories B, C and F (setting up young farmers, investments in agriculture and modernization, training and advising, agri-environmental aid, aid to disadvantaged areas, conversion of agricultural land to forests, etc.). Also important are the aids to developing infrastructures within the GSSE in Categories K and N. An even higher percentage of the state aids are provided to individual producers and are concentrated in PSE Category B on financing the use of variable inputs (aids to agricultural insurance) and fixed inputs (e.g. machinery renewals and stock-breeding). The small proportion dedicated to general services supports promotion and marketing activities, pest control, and aids to Sanitary Defense Groups (Categories L and N). The aids from the regional governments are given to individual producers in PSE Categories B and G (aids to insurance and fuel, modernization, sustainable production, acquiring land and machinery, bee-keeping, stock-breeding, compensation for adverse weather, etc.). A large amount is concentrated in general services through developing infrastructures, promotion and marketing and health measures (Categories K, L and N). Figure 1 shows the composition of support from within Spain by the origin of the transfers. The biggest contribution to the NATIONAL TSE, almost 50%, is from co-financed rural development, followed by state transfers, with an average weight of 35%, while regional support is only 15%. The NATIONAL PSE is composed of co-financed rural development (45%) and state transfers (45%), regional support (10%). NATIONAL GSSE is formed by co-financed rural development (61%), regional transfers (29%), while the state contribution is 10%. Table 4 shows that Spain received an annual average of €11 100m in CAP TSE between 2002 and 2013. The CAP contributions can be seen to fall from €14 300m in 2002 to €8,500m in 2013. The measures in which these CAP transfers were made will be given below (general service and producer support). Source: Compiled by the authors.
The concentration of total support in Andalusia, Castilla & León, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia, Aragón and Extremadura shows the relatively higher support to the sub-sectors: sheep and goat rearing, beef cattle, wine, cereals and olive oil, with differences between the continental agricultural regions (highly subsidized) and the fruit and vegetable regions. Spanish agriculture is undoubtedly diverse and complex. Its geographical size, topography and climatic variations imply considerable differences in the production of the different regions. These differences can be seen in Table 4 in the territorial distribution of total CAP support. Another fundamental difference between the ACs lies in the way support is provided, with important production-based payments in specialized regions (dairy products in Galicia, and fruit and vegetables in the Mediterranean areas) while in other regions most support is given in the form of direct payments not related to production (Andalusia, Aragón, both Castillas and Extremadura).
The growth of GDP and the reduced total support in nominal terms have led to a significant drop in CAP TSE as a percentage of GDP (from 1.99% to 0.83%), still above the EU and OECD average (0.75%) (Note 11). Extremadura and both Castillas receive the relatively high values of over 3%, while Asturias, Cantabria, The (
1) Transfers for Support to General Services and the Loss of EU Co-Financing
The General Services Support to Agriculture from CAP transfers, shown in Table 5 shows the financial breakdown of these events, as well as the elimination of the Operative Programs in force until 2006, whose funds are included in the CAP GSSE in the present study. However, since 2007 only the structural measures financed by the EAGF and EAFRD are included, as can be seen in Figure 2 . In the last seven years of this period, the CAP GSSE rose from €270m to more than €510m in 2011, but in the last two years of the Health Check (2012 and 2013), when the economic crisis reached a peak, this figure was reduced by 30% to the €360m cited above. The CAP PSE indicator is shown in Table 6 , in which the annual average figure is €9,700m for the period. In Figure 3 the composition of the CAP PSE is broken down by types of measure and an evaluation is made of the impact of the measures introduced in the Mid-Term Reform, especially the reduction of production-based payments and their gradual replacement by decoupled payments (single payments). Figure 3 shows the pillars on which the reform was based: a sharp drop in production-based payments (Category A), reduced payments per hectare and head of cattle (Category C) and a sharp increase in decoupled payments (Category E). In 2002 almost 70% of the CAP PSE consisted of production-based support and most of it was granted through prices, which is the decoupled-zero reference. After 2006 and the introduction of the single payment by the Mid-term Reform, the situation began to change. In that year the value of Category A fell to 52% (though still high due to the predominance of frontier-protection measures in the dairy and vegetable sectors, the maintenance of internal prices in products such as rice and dairy derivatives, and the predominance of direct payments to production in the Mediterranean sectors such as oil and wine, tobacco and cattle) while decoupled payments reached a value of 23%. One decade later, Category A had been reduced to 43%. However, this form of price and production support is still in force due to import duties, which are still the main protection in most OECD countries and explain the persistence of domestic prices higher than the world average (Note 15). The CAP PSE Category C, direct payments per hectare and head of cattle, created in 1992, and currently replaced by "green box" decoupled payments, reached a maximum in 2005 at 28.4%. However, four years later it had fallen to 10.4%. The reductions in Categories A and C were compensated for by the single payment (Category E), which represented 54.4% of the CAP PSE in 2012 (it did not exist eight years previously).
The different starting points and the different production specialties of the territories gave rise to a series of changes of varying intensity, which allows one to speculate that the rate of adaptation to the reform of agricultural policies is faster in some regions than others, i.e. the different effects of the Mid-Term Reform and the Health Check. The greatest impact was in Aragón, both Castillas, Andalusia and Extremadura, due to the reduced weight of production-based support, compensated by higher percentages of direct payments per hectare and head of cattle or in a single payment for specializing in cereals, stock breeding or olive oil. Navarra and Asturias are closest to the average Spanish evolution and maintain their production-based support around 30%. The weakest impact was found in Galicia, Madrid and the Mediterranean coast, where the specialization in milk and vegetables keeps their production-based support above 40%.
(i) Market Price Support (MPS) and Rising World Prices
It can be seen in Table 7 that the reduction in CAP PSE was due to the reduction in MPS, which, with an annual average of €4,000m was reduced by 66% after 2002 (60% in Europe) (Note 16). The drastic evolution of MPS was due not only to the change in the CAP model after 1992 but also to higher world prices. MPS is concentrated in the large production regions of Andalusia, Castilla & León, Catalonia and Aragón, and in the fruit and vegetable producing regions of Valencia and Murcia and in milk-producing Galicia. Even though the drop in MPS is inexorable in all regions, it still survives due to the predominance of protective customs duties in the fruit and vegetable and dairy sectors, the price maintenance of rice and dairy products and to the Mediterranean products whose prices have not risen as high as those in other regions. Vol. 9, No. 6; Source: Compiled by the authors.
A Small Boost to Agricultural Competitiveness
Support for competitiveness is included in the European Rural Development policy, with an Axis 1 of structural measures designed to promote a model of agriculture based on competitive, efficient and innovative holdings. The analysis of the Spanish competitive model reveals serious weaknesses. As can be seen in Table 8 , the mean value of the EAFRD Axis 1 was €600m annually, or 45% of the support to Rural Development (Note 17). In spite of growing by 350% between 2007 and 2013, it was only equal to 80% of the total support to Spain from the CAP TSE in 2013, figures that show the weakness of the intervention in terms of competitiveness. On a regional scale, the comparison reveals considerable differences in strategies. In general, the distribution of Axis 1 funds is concentrated in the ACs with the highest levels of public support to agriculture: Castilla & León, Andalusia, Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha, Catalonia and Aragón, which receive between 9.5 and 15%. At the other extreme, Madrid, Cantabria, The Balearics, La Rioja and The Basque Country receive less than 2.2%. However, if the percentage of total CAP support destined to promote competitiveness is considered, the leaders are La Rioja, The Balearics, The Basque Country, Galicia, Catalonia and Extremadura, with percentages between 12 and 20%.
When the amount of Axis 1 is divided according to its origin (see Figure 4) it can be seen that the funds provided by the EAFRD have risen continuously since 2007, with a slowdown between 2010 and 2012 due to the world economic crisis. However, the ever tighter Spanish budgets, hit hard by the crisis, have put the co-financing of the support to competitiveness in serious danger, precisely at a time in history when a more efficient use of funds is crucial. 
Discussion
The intense reform of the CAP has meant a profound change in the model of support to European agriculture. There is no doubt that the transfers to agriculture by the EU are being increasingly decoupled from production, to ensure their compatibility with the multilateral system of commercial rules. Vol. 9, No. 6; transfers, whose apparent reduction is no more than the reflection of the rise in world prices, and in their territorial distribution. This latter aspect is highly unequal in Spain due to the development of the CAP itself, the diversity of products and the use of historic references to fix the value of decoupled payments to holdings. Thus, this work calculates the annual average CAP transfer to Spain since 2002 as €11 100m (€8,500m in 2013), with most of the aid going to Andalusia, Castilla & León, Castilla-La Mancha and Catalonia, due to the greater relative weight of CAP support to the stock-rearing, cattle, wine, cereals and olive oil sub-sectors. This highlights the difference between the (highly subsidized) continental agriculture regions and the fruit and vegetable growing regions, which do not receive the same volume of transfers, and include the dairy regions, which are tied to market-price support. When the Spanish contribution is included, the figures rise by a little over 10%.
As regards the total value of the aids received, this study has shown that the €600m spent annually on incentives to make holdings more competitive (less than 5% of total public support) is insufficient and leaves Spanish producers in a precarious position, especially the smallest. Of the annual €600m, the Spanish contribution to co-financing is in serious danger, as are the aids in other areas, due to the sharp cuts in public spending caused by the economic crisis and the fact that other areas have been given higher priority. Also, their distribution by regions is very unequal and reveals the wide differences in the strategies of the different autonomous communities. La Rioja, The Balearics, The Basque Country, Galicia, Catalonia and Extremadura encourage competitiveness by assigning between 12 and 20% of their available funds to this end.
From the above it can be seen that not enough is being done in Spain to promote competitiveness. There is no doubt that direct payments make up the bulk of the CAP, due to their budgetary importance (over two thirds of the agricultural funds) and they have always been at the center of attention in debates on the CAP. The figures cited in this paper are aimed at stimulating the political debate on competitiveness, since in the authors' opinion it is one of the biggest challenges to the rural development policies.
This work has shown that until 2013 agricultural transfers in Spain have depended on the historic CAP support model and have had little to do with remunerating farmers for the public service they provide, or with restructuring, modernizing and adapting to a more competitive environment. It would appear that the new CAP 2014-2020, which includes environmental objectives in direct payments, is the beginning of the end of the status quo and historical references. As always, Spain has again opted for reducing to the minimum the wide differences in the size of the payments to its farmers. Spanish agriculture now faces the need to adapt itself to a difficult and ever-changing international situation. The CAP 2014-2020 Rural Development programs provide the basis for implementing the necessary investment on a regional scale, to modernize holdings in order to boost production and improve environmental aspects, increase incomes, employment, standards of living, the economic and social cohesion of rural communities, and put an end to the long-term tendency of disinvestment that limits rural development. The national, regional and local administrations have a responsibility to plan alternative economic strategies for the different territories and provide them with sufficient funds for their needs, in our opinion a crucial issue.
Future lines of research will go deeper into the results obtained in the present study. The new CAP 2014-2020 direct payments system, which came into force in 2015, needs further analysis from the regional perspective (basic, green, young farmers, coupled direct payments, aids to naturally disadvantaged zones, and redistributive payments). Bearing in mind that Spain has opted for a national model that does not include redistributive payments or aids to disadvantaged areas, the aim of the analysis will be to evaluate the degree of convergence obtained by these payments with respect to the previous situation and their impact on the regions themselves, on the sub-sectors, on individual holdings, etc. In short, the aim will be to answer the question of whether Spain has made any progress towards a more equitable system of payments. Another natural continuation of this line of research will be to look for viable strategies to boost competitiveness and innovation in the agriculture of the different ACs, including the development of new products, processes and technologies, the selection of successful experiences and assessing their suitability for implementation in other regions.
